The Payment Times Reporting Scheme now has a public fast payer list, a slow payer direction power, and a regulator with new enforcement tools. ACCC penalties for anti-competitive conduct have already doubled to $100 million, with unfair trading practice laws on the way. Neither measure solves late payment overnight. But they represent a meaningful shift in who holds the pressure.

Getting paid on time in construction has never been simple. Cash flow pressure is felt at every level of a project, and the consequences of a timing mismatch compound quickly for everyone involved. That dynamic is not new. 

The result is a sector where average payment times to small businesses range from 32 to 50 days or more according to industry data, where 11.6 per cent of small construction businesses carry payments overdue by more than 60 days, and where around 70 per cent of contractors and subcontractors experience regular payment delays. Those figures have consequences that extend well beyond the businesses carrying the debt. Late payment is a documented driver of construction insolvency, workforce instability and the risk markups that flow through to project costs.

Two separate but connected developments in the current federal budget cycle address this problem. The first is an enhanced Payment Times Reporting Scheme with new enforcement tools that are already operating. The second is a doubling of maximum ACCC penalties for anti-competitive and anti-consumer conduct, legislation that has already passed Parliament and took effect in March 2026.

Neither measure is a silver bullet. Payment culture in construction is deeply embedded, legally complex and commercially entrenched. But the regulatory environment is shifting in a direction that is materially more favourable to small businesses and subcontractors than it was twelve months ago. Understanding what has changed, and how it works, is worth the time.

The Payment Times Reporting Scheme: What It Is and How It Has Changed

The Payment Times Reporting Scheme was introduced in 2020 as a transparency mechanism requiring large businesses with consolidated annual revenue of $100 million or more to report publicly on how quickly they pay their small business suppliers. The scheme was designed on the premise that public disclosure of payment practices would create reputational pressure on slow payers and encourage improvement.

In practice, the original scheme had limitations. Reporting was complex, inconsistent and poorly understood. The regulator had limited powers to act on what the data revealed. And the reputational incentive for paying quickly was largely theoretical because there was no corresponding recognition mechanism for good behaviour.

A statutory review conducted by Dr Craig Emerson in 2023 identified these weaknesses and made 14 recommendations, all of which the government accepted. The resulting Payment Times Reporting Amendment Act 2024 received royal assent on 9 July 2024, with most provisions commencing from September 2024. The reformed scheme has been progressively implemented since, with a new reporting portal launched in February 2026.

The reformed scheme does several things that the original did not. It is worth understanding each of them specifically.

The original Payment Times Reporting Scheme had limited teeth. The reformed version that is now operating has a public fast payer list, a slow payer direction power, enhanced regulator enforcement tools, and the ability to name non-compliant entities faster. That is a meaningfully different instrument.

The Fast Small Business Payer List: Reputation as Incentive

The reformed scheme now publicly recognises businesses that pay their small business suppliers quickly. The Fast Small Business Payer List was officially launched in early 2026 and is publicly available on the Payment Times Reports Register, updating daily.

To appear on the list, a large business must demonstrate payment practices that put them in the fastest tier of payers. Businesses on the list are permitted to use that recognition in corporate publications, on their website and in advertising and promotional materials.

This matters to construction subcontractors not because it solves their payment problems but because it creates a positive signal in the market. A head contractor or developer on the fast payer list is making a verifiable, publicly accountable commitment to prompt payment. For subcontractors choosing between clients, that information has commercial value. For developers and head contractors seeking to attract quality subcontractors in a constrained labour and trades market, fast payer status becomes a business development asset.

The incentive works in both directions. Recognition for paying quickly is designed to complement pressure on those who pay slowly, which is where the enforcement side of the scheme becomes relevant.

The Slow Payer Direction: Naming and Requiring Disclosure

The scheme can now identify reporting entities in the slowest 20 per cent of payers overall or within their industry sector and require enhanced disclosure. This means a large business in the bottom quintile of payment performance can be directed to disclose its slow payment practices more prominently, including on its website and in financial statements.

The Payment Times Regulator issued its first Slow Small Business Payer Direction in 2025-26, and the January 2026 Regulator’s Update confirmed that compliance and enforcement is a priority focus area. In the reporting cycle to June 2025 alone, the regulator contacted 1,334 suspected non-reporters, sent 202 warning letters about late reports and issued infringement notices under the Regulatory Powers Act against entities it believed had reasonable grounds to be in breach.

The 95th percentile payment time has been introduced as a key metric in reporting. This figure shows how long it takes for 95 per cent of small business invoices to be paid, which is a more meaningful measure of payment behaviour than an average. An average payment time can look reasonable while a long tail of slow payments inflicts serious damage on small suppliers. The 95th percentile captures that tail.

For construction subcontractors, the practical value of these measures is indirect but real. Large developers and head contractors that are required to report on their payment times, and that face public identification as slow payers, have a reputational and commercial incentive to improve. That pressure is not the same as a legal obligation to pay within a specified timeframe, but it is structural pressure that did not exist under the original scheme.

Enhanced Regulator Powers: Faster Enforcement

The reformed scheme has also expanded what the regulator can actually do when it identifies non-compliance or poor behaviour. The regulator can now gather information by notice to produce rather than requiring on-site inspection, which significantly reduces the time and friction involved in investigation. It can add and redact information on the Register quickly. It can publish non-compliance findings more efficiently. And it can accept enforceable undertakings from non-compliant entities as part of a remediation process.

These are not headline-grabbing powers. But they matter because the original scheme’s enforcement bottlenecks were a primary reason it had limited practical effect. A regulator that can investigate faster, publish findings faster and accept binding commitments to improve creates a more credible deterrent than one that can only make referrals after slow administrative processes.

The scheme applies to businesses with annual consolidated revenue of $100 million or more. That captures the large developers, national head contractors, publicly listed builders and major commercial operators that sit above smaller construction businesses in the payment chain. The scheme does not directly regulate how a mid-size head contractor pays its subbies. But it applies pressure at the top of the chain that, in theory, flows down.

The question that remains open is whether voluntary improvement in payment practices will actually reach subcontractors working several tiers below the reporting entities. Project trust accounts, already operating in Queensland and under consideration in other states, address that question at the contract level more directly than the reporting scheme does. The two approaches are complementary, not alternatives.

The Payment Times Reporting Scheme applies pressure at the top of the payment chain. Project trust accounts in Queensland address it at the contract level. Both are moving in the same direction. Neither alone is sufficient for a subcontractor waiting on a payment 60 days past due.

The ACCC Penalty Doubling: Already Law

The second development is distinct from the Payment Times Reporting Scheme but directly relevant to small construction businesses that face anti-competitive conduct or unfair terms from larger players.

On 26 March 2026, the Treasury Laws Amendment (Doubling Penalties for ACCC Enforcement) Act 2026 passed Parliament and commenced on 28 March 2026. This is not a budget announcement. It is already law. The maximum corporate penalty for breaches of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and the Australian Consumer Law has doubled from $50 million to $100 million per contravention.

The increase applies across the most significant competition and consumer law prohibitions, including cartel conduct, misuse of market power, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, unconscionable conduct, false or misleading representations, unfair contract terms and product safety breaches. The other two limbs of the penalty test, three times the value of the benefit obtained or 30 per cent of adjusted turnover during the breach period, remain unchanged.

To understand what this means in context: penalties for these same breaches increased five-fold in November 2022, from $10 million to $50 million. They have now doubled again to $100 million, less than four years later. The ACCC has described this increase as a clear signal that penalties should not be treated as a cost of doing business.

The legislation was framed initially around deterring misconduct in the fuel sector during the Middle East supply shock, but White and Case, Ashurst and Gilbert and Tobin have all noted in their analysis that the increase applies economy-wide. Every sector. Every type of conduct covered by the Act. That includes construction.

What the ACCC Penalty Increase Means for Small Construction Businesses

For a subcontractor or small builder dealing with a large head contractor or developer, the direct relevance of a $100 million maximum penalty may not be immediately obvious. Most disputes between small and large construction businesses are not matters of cartel conduct or market power misuse in the technical sense.

But several categories of conduct that are relevant to construction businesses do fall within the scope of the Act and are now subject to these larger penalties.

Unconscionable conduct is one. This is conduct in trade or commerce that is, in all the circumstances, against conscience. It includes taking advantage of a party’s vulnerable position, using superior bargaining power to impose unreasonable conditions, or engaging in sharp practice that falls short of fraud but exceeds what a reasonable person would accept as legitimate. Subcontractors operating under one-sided standard form contracts with take-it-or-leave-it terms, or facing pressure to accept variations below cost under threat of losing future work, are in territory where unconscionable conduct arguments can arise.

Unfair contract terms is another. Since 2022, unfair terms in standard form contracts with small businesses have been prohibited under the Australian Consumer Law. A small business is one with fewer than 100 employees or less than $10 million in annual turnover. Unfair terms in construction contracts with small subcontractors meeting this definition are now subject to penalties. The ACCC has identified unfair contract terms as a targeted enforcement priority for 2026-27.

Misuse of market power is a third. Where a large contractor or developer with substantial market position takes advantage of that position in a way that damages smaller competitors or suppliers, the conduct is prohibited. In concentrated regional construction markets, where a dominant head contractor controls access to most available projects, the power dynamic can be significant.

The practical constraint is that the ACCC cannot take every case. It has enforcement priorities and limited resources. Individual subcontractors cannot file personal complaints and expect rapid enforcement action. What the higher penalty regime does is raise the stakes for entities engaging in conduct at the margins, create a stronger deterrent for systematic behaviour, and signal to courts that Parliament views these breaches seriously.

Unconscionable conduct, unfair contract terms and misuse of market power are all covered by the increased penalties. The ACCC has identified unfair contract terms as a 2026-27 enforcement priority. Small construction businesses in disputes with large counterparties should understand that this regulatory environment is more active than it has been in years.

Unfair Trading Practices: What Is Coming

Beyond the penalty increase, a separate piece of legislation is working through Parliament that has direct relevance to construction supply chain dynamics. The Competition and Consumer Amendment (Unfair Trading Practices) Bill 2026 was introduced on 1 April 2026 after a consultation draft in February 2026. If passed, it will prohibit unfair trading practices in business-to-business and business-to-consumer relationships from 1 July 2027.

Unfair trading practices covers a broader range of conduct than unfair contract terms. It extends to behaviour during the performance of a contract, not just the terms of the contract itself. This includes pressure tactics, deceptive conduct, exploiting information asymmetries and using superior bargaining position to extract concessions.

For subcontractors who have experienced head contractors using the threat of non-payment, delayed certification or blacklisting to extract variations or pricing concessions, the unfair trading practices framework is directly relevant. It is not yet law, and the detail of what will and will not be captured by the final legislation will matter enormously. But the direction of travel is clear.

The bill is expected to take effect from 1 July 2027 subject to parliamentary passage. Businesses across the construction supply chain should be aware it is coming and that the ACCC has signalled it will actively enforce the provisions.

The Bigger Picture: Two Instruments, One Direction

The Payment Times Reporting Scheme and the ACCC penalty regime operate through different mechanisms but point in the same direction. Large businesses that control the top of construction supply chains face growing accountability, both through public transparency about payment behaviour and through harder financial consequences for conduct that crosses legal lines.

Neither measure eliminates the structural cash flow pressure that defines life for subcontractors and small builders. A reporting scheme does not force a developer to pay 30-day terms. A $100 million maximum penalty does not compensate a subbbie who is 60 days overdue on a payment that represents 40 per cent of their monthly revenue.

What they do, together, is shift the risk-reward calculation for large businesses. Slow payment used to be largely consequence-free. It cost nothing beyond the relationship damage that most larger players could absorb. It is becoming more costly, both reputationally through the PTRS and legally through the ACCC regime.

For subcontractors and small builders, the practical actions remain the same regardless of what the regulator is doing: document everything, issue progress claims correctly and on time, understand your Security of Payment Act rights in your state, and do not rely on informal payment arrangements that are not written into the contract. The regulatory environment is improving. It is not yet strong enough to substitute for your own payment management.

But the trajectory matters. And the trajectory, for the first time in some years, is moving in the right direction.

For ongoing coverage of the 2026-27 federal budget and its implications for Australian builders and subcontractors, follow The Good Builder.

General Information Disclaimer:
This article draws on the Payment Times Reporting Scheme legislation and regulator updates, the Treasury Laws Amendment (Doubling Penalties for ACCC Enforcement) Act 2026 and analysis from White and Case, Ashurst, Gilbert and Tobin, Macpherson Kelley and BDO. It is provided as editorial commentary for industry professionals and does not constitute legal or commercial advice. Subcontractors and small businesses with specific payment or competition disputes should seek qualified legal advice.

Author: TGB Editorial